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ABSTRACT 
 
Federalism refers to an arrangement between several States which agree to be united together as a nation state. The 
administration of a federal state will be shared between a central government and the member States. There are two 
major types of federalism; dual federalism and cooperative federalism. While the former holds that the federal and 
state governments are co-equals with specific powers granted by the constitution, the latter denotes that although 
federal government is supreme over States, both acts cooperatively to solve common problem. To appreciate the 
meaning of federalism and federal-state relation, different approaches towards federalism will be analyze. It 
demonstrates how different concepts of federal-state relation can improve the management of a country and solve 
conflict between different levels of governments. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Federalisme merujuk persetujuan antara beberapa negeri untuk bersatu sebagai sebuah negara. Pentadbiran 
sesebuah negara persekutuan akan dikongsi antara kerajaan pusat dan kerajaan negeri. Terdapat dua sistem 
federalisme yang utama; dwifederalisme dan federalisme kerjasama. Dwifederalisme menunjukkan bahawa 
kerajaan persekutuan dan negeri mempunyai kuasa tertentu yang diperuntukkan oleh perlembagaan, manakala 
federalisme kerjasama menyatakan bahawa walaupun kerajaan persekutuan lebih banyak kuasa daripada kerajaan 
negeri, kedua-dua pihak akan bekerjasama untuk menyelesaikan masalah yang berkaitan. Untuk menghargai makna 
federalisme dan hubungan antara kerajaan persekutuan dengan negeri, pendekatan berbeza terhadap federalisme 
akan dianalisis. Artikel ini menunjukkan bahawa konsep yang berbeza tentang hubungan kerajaan persekutuan dan 
negeri dapat melancarkan pentadbiran sesebuah negara dan menyelesaikan konflik antara pelbagai peringkat 
kerajaan. 
 
Kata kunci: Federalisme; dwifederalisme; federalisme kerjasama 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The jurisdictions accorded to the federal and 
state governments in a federation are 
normally laid down in the Constitution of 
the Federation. In this respect, Faruqi 
explains that the constitution is the 
fundamental foundation that designs the 
‘basic framework’ of the country, as it lays 
down the structure of the government and 
describes the extent of powers and functions 
of various organs of the state.
1
 This 
corresponds with Aristotle’s view that a 
constitution can be either a frame of 
government, or the map of the distribution 
of social or economic power, or the 
establishment of the moral dimensions of the 
body politic.
2
 This article will elaborate on 
the theory and concept of federal-state 
relation and determine whether certain 
concept of federal-state relation can improve 
the management of a country and solve 
conflict between them. 
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FEDERATION: A CONSTITUITIONAL 
SET UP 
 
The late Professor Elazar stated that all 
constitutional systems consisted of several 
components with adjustment made in certain 
sectors to fit the circumstances of a country; 
however as ancient constitutionalism 
emphasized on socioeconomic distribution 
of power, modern constitution emphasizes 
more on the frame of government.
3
 In this 
regard, Yusoff emphasized that in any 
federation, the constitution becomes an 
important instrument for dividing powers 
between two or more levels of government.
4
 
He quoted Birch who explained that power 
division will lead ‘each [level] in its own 
sphere, is coordinate with the others, and 
each acts directly on the people through its 
own administrative agencies.
5
 
Other authors have attempted to 
enumerate the attributes of federalism as 
compared to other forms of political 
organization. For example Lijphart (1985) 
defines federalism in terms of primary and 
secondary principles. In this regard, the 
primary element of federalism is the 
guaranteed division of power between 
central and regional governments. He further 
argues that this primary element is supported 
by five secondary attributes of federalism as 
described below: 
 
i. A written constitution which specifies the 
division of power and guarantees to central 
and regional governments that their allotted 
powers cannot be taken away;  
ii. A bicameral legislature in which one 
chamber represents the people at large and 
the other components units of the federation; 
iii. Over-representation of the smaller 
component units in the federal chamber of 
the bicameral legislature; 
iv. The right of the component units to be 
involved in the process of amending the 
federal constitution and to change their own 
constitution unilaterally; and   
v. Decentralized government, that is, the 
regional governments’ share of power in a 
federation is relatively large compared with 
that of regional governments in unitary 
States.
6
 
 
In addition to Lijphart (1987), Daniel J. 
Elazar identifies six ambiguities linked with 
federalism as a theoretical and operational 
concept. In this respect, he argues that 
federalism can be identified either as a mean 
to achieve and maintain unity and diversity 
or as the structure and the process of 
government. It can also be seen as both a 
political and cultural phenomenon and can 
be pursued for both limited and 
comprehensive ends. It emerges as a mean 
to accommodate the spreading desire of 
people to employ common resources while 
maintaining their cultural distinctiveness 
within a larger polity.
7
 The theoretical 
discourses on federalism normally clarify 
the relationship between the federal and 
States governments. In this respect, Feeley 
and Rubin (2008) explain; 
 
A theory of federalism is a general account of the 
structural arrangement of dual levels of government, 
one that goes beyond simple description of a 
particular federal system, a paired comparison of two 
or more federal systems, a legal analysis that seeks to 
formulate workable rules for defining boundaries and 
providing a convincing rationale for them once they 
have been drawn, or a historical analysis that traces 
changes in relationship between central state and 
constituent units.
8
 
 
Federalism generally concerns with 
diffusion of political power in the name of 
liberty with the aim to achieve unity or 
energetic government.
9 
With regard to this 
Elazar (1985) argued; “the federal idea rests 
on the principle that political and social 
institutions and relationship are best 
established through covenants, compacts, or 
other contractual arrangement”.10 To 
correspond with Elazar’s theory, several 
definitions have been propounded based on 
their operational concepts. Rodee et. al see 
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federalism as “ a constitutional definition of 
governmental power between the national 
and constitutional units, whilst  Friedrich 
defined federalism as “a union of group 
united by one or more common objectives 
but retaining their distinctive group being 
for other purposes.
11
 On a different note, 
Babalawe believes that federalism 
“advocates and promotes the form of 
organization of a state in which power is 
dispersed or decentralized by contract as a 
means of safeguarding local entities and 
individual liberties”.12 This echoes Elazar’s 
belief that federalism requires considerable 
tolerance of diversity and willingness to take 
political action through conciliation. It is a 
viable option for multi-cultural States that 
willing to unite, share common resources 
and achieve political integration and 
stability. 
It is interesting to note that several 
federal arrangements exist in practice where 
countries can apply the federalism concept 
either strictly or partially. This has led some 
writers to argue whether one country 
conforms to a federal criteria and one does 
not. Wheare (1953) suggested that the 
United States of America is the best model 
for the modern idea of federal government 
and regarded some countries as quasi-
federal for subordinating one unit of 
government to the central government 
within their constitution. Thus countries like 
Nigeria, Malaysia and India are to be 
regarded as quasi-federal as the federal 
government is permitted to declare a state of 
emergency on any state and to take over the 
running of the government of certain region 
for a specific period of time.
13 
In contrast, 
Elazar (1985) noted that there is more than 
one way to apply federal principles when he 
said that “federalism can be considered a 
genus of political organization of which 
there are several species.”14 He argued that 
the United States of America invented 
modern federalism but added a federation as 
a second form. He regarded Europe as 
confederation when preexisting entities 
joined to form a common government for 
specified purposes. He further noted that, as 
a consequence of the World War II, new 
federal arrangements have been developed 
in the form of federacies, associated States 
arrangements and common market.
15
 All 
these remain part of federal arrangement 
with slight adjustment is made according to 
the need of societies in those countries.  
There are also arguments that States 
decide to join a federation due to the 
benefits that it offers. Inman and Rubinfeld 
(1997) argue that federalism encourages 
efficient allocation of natural resources, 
fosters political participation and protects 
basic liberties and freedom.
16 
This will guide 
them to decide on the characteristic of 
federalism that they would want based on 
the number of layers of government, the 
amount of representation in the federal 
government and most importantly the 
amount of authority that each levels of 
government will get.
17
 Although federalism 
permits diversity, increase political 
participation and improves efficiency can be 
used to protect certain privileged group. The 
state and local governments can also 
frustrate national policy and obstruct actions 
on national issues. This is not the case in 
Malaysia as dual and centralized federalism 
permits the federal government to spread the 
benefits and costs of government unevenly 
with poorer States like Perlis, Kedah, Sabah 
and Sarawak and even lower financial 
assistance to the state government under the 
opposition like Kelantan. It is timely that 
Malaysia revisits the concept of federal and 
state government relationship in the United 
States of America and Australia especially 
in environmental or natural resources 
management.  
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DUAL FEDERALISM 
 
Dual federalism is a concept to describe a 
federal-state relation when both 
governments enjoy exclusive and non-
overlapping spheres of authority. This is a 
normal type of federalism as States that join 
the federation will want to remain as 
independent governments as they were 
before and do not want to be treated as an 
administrative subdivision of the federal 
government. It has been referred to as the 
layer-cake federalism since each level of 
governments has their own administrative 
and legislative jurisdiction. In South 
Carolina v United States,
18
 Justice Brewer 
described dual federalism as: 
 
A dual system of government, national and state, 
each operating within the same territory and upon the 
same persons; and yet working without collision, 
because their functions are different. There are 
certain matters over which the National Government 
has absolute control, and no action of the State can 
interfere therewith, and there are others in which the 
State is supreme, and in respect to them the National 
Government is powerless.
19
 
 
Dual federalism usually becomes a common 
practice in a federation as it ensures each 
state remains sovereign despite being 
control to some extent by the federal 
government. It ensures that States possess 
exclusive control over their natural 
resources and remain powerful in their 
localities. In most constitutions, distinct 
division of federal and state legislative 
powers exhibit clear practice of dual 
federalism with natural resources remain 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
States. In Malaysia, the States of Sabah and 
Sarawak gain extra powers compared to 
other States in West Malaysia as a result of 
agreement to join the Federation of 
Malaysia. This can be seen in supplements 
to the State List (List IIA) and the 
Concurrent List (List IIIA) of the Ninth 
Schedule of the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia where they continue to possess 
powers over native law and customs, ports 
and hydroelectricity. The financial 
provisions however remain centralized with 
the majority of the income goes to the 
federal fund. The federal government also 
has more legislative power over States and 
may legislate on state matters under several 
circumstances. This is due to the fact that 
historically, Malaysia has been constructed 
as a centralised federal state and the 
centralisation was made to achieve 
efficiency and development.
20 
In other parts of the world, dual 
federalism has been practiced in countries 
like the United States of America, Australia, 
Canada, Brazil and India. In the United 
States of America, States have reserved 
powers that need to be taken into account in 
determining the extent of powers vested in 
the federal government.
21
 This indicates that 
States are allowed to perform some of the 
functions of government free from federal 
government interference. As will be 
discussed later, this position changed in the 
1930s when the New Deal policies were 
introduced to encourage more cooperation 
between the federal and state governments 
due to industrialization and globalization. 
Nevertheless, as the federal government’s 
role expanded over the century, a shift 
towards new federalism took place in 1970s 
to return or devolve some of the power to 
the state government.
22
 This was done 
mainly on the basis of the subsidiarity 
principle to give appropriate decision 
making power to the lowest appropriate 
level of government. The same progress 
from dual to cooperative federalism and 
back to devolution or decentralization can be 
seen in India. The 73
rd
 and 74
th 
amendment 
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to the Indian constitution for instance 
created the third tier of government called 
Panchayati Raj based on the subsidiarity 
principle.
23
  
The arguments whether dual 
federalism is still valid or should be 
discarded has been continuously debated in 
the United States of America. This is 
especially true in the context of 
environmental policy. Engel argues that 
overlaps between the government often 
occurs and static allocation of authority 
between them contradict the process of 
federal policymaking in which multiple 
levels of government interact in the 
regulatory process. Thus, management of 
environmental ills should be allocated to one 
or the other level of government with 
minimal overlap.
24
 He further argues that 
such allocation “deprives citizens of the 
benefits of overlapping jurisdiction such as a 
built-in check upon interest group capture, 
opportunities for regulatory innovation and 
refinement, and relief for the courts from the 
often futile and confusing task of 
jurisdictional line-drawing.” 
Although dual federalism is not the 
exact reflection of most federal system 
today, critics continue to discourse about 
relevancy of dualist federalism. Schapiro 
argues that dualist federalism must be 
inherently local so that it goes beyond the 
reach of federal power and vice versa.
25
 
Although dualist federalism accepts some 
overlap of state and federal authority, it 
seeks to safeguard some sacred precincts of 
complete state or federal hegemony.
26 
He 
further explains that the court is often left 
with a difficult task to distinguish these 
boundaries, i.e. what is truly ‘local’ or truly 
‘national’. In some situation, the court 
accepts that there are overlaps due to 
dualism but has difficulty in addressing 
them, especially in interstate issues.
27
 As 
Young puts it, the court has to divide the 
world into two categories like local or 
national; interstate of intrastate; 
manufacturing or commerce; in order to 
“describe distinct fields of regulatory 
jurisdiction in which one government or the 
other would have exclusive authority.”28 
This confuses the general public and 
prevents them from exercising self-
governance responsibly. 
The determinations whether a subject 
matter fall within the jurisdiction of the 
federal or state government have been 
determined by applying the doctrine of “pith 
and substance” in Malaysia. In the case of 
Mamat b Daud v Government of Malaysia, 
the applicants was charged under section 
298A of the federal Penal Code for doing a 
religious act that may cause disunity.
29 
By 
applying the doctrine of “pith and 
substance” the court held that section 298A 
was unconstitutional since religion is a state 
matter. In this respect, the law was referred 
to as colorable since it pretends to be 
legislation on public order when in pith & 
substance it is about religious offences. In 
Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & 
Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors the court 
applied the doctrine to prevent the 
application of the federal law requirement 
for Environmental Impact Assessment in the 
state of Sarawak although both have 
concurrent power regulate the production, 
supply and distribution of electricity.
30
 This 
is because environment is a state matter 
under Item 2(a) of List II and Item 13 of List 
IIIA of the Federal Constitution. 
 It appears that strict dualist approach 
to federalism does not fit in the process of 
globalization and climate change. As more 
and more natural resources are being 
impacted by climate change and as the local 
industries are becoming more open to threats 
of globalization, state requires further 
assistance by the federal government to 
initiate policies that can ensure a win-win 
situation to all. In Malaysia, the federal 
government has been heavily involved in 
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addressing issues like water resources which 
is mostly local in nature. Although the 
federal government has the power sharing  
in water supply and services since 2005, the 
water that is supplied through the pipe 
originates from rivers in States and only 
States should determine whether the 
amounts of water resources is adequate or to 
initiates interstate water transfer. The fact 
that National Water Services Commission 
(SPAN) becomes the only regulator in water 
supply and services raises the issue of how 
jurisdictions need to be shared between 
governments when a matter falls under the 
Concurrent List.  
 
 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
 
If dual federalism holds that the federal and 
state governments are co-equals with 
specific powers granted by the constitution, 
cooperative federalism denotes that although 
federal government is supreme over States, 
both acts cooperatively to solve common 
problem. This concept recognizes that 
overlaps do occur when the federal and state 
governments are exercising their authority 
granted under the constitution. Due to this, 
the concept has been also referred to as the 
marble cake federalism to represent the 
inevitable overlapping duties of the two 
governments similar to the mixing colors of 
a marble cake.
31
 Other authors have also 
introduced other terms to describe a similar 
notion to cooperative federalism. Schapiro 
refers it as interactive federalism which 
means both parties disregards the boundaries 
between them and embraces any 
overlapping through cooperation.
32
 Engel 
however terms the concept as dynamic 
federalism as he believes that rather than 
defining federal and state authority, the 
“policymakers, courts, and scholars should 
seek ways to harness and channel the 
political motivations that lead to 
jurisdictional overlap to minimize its 
downsides; through legislative solutions that 
allow States to innovate within the bounds 
of federal ground rules while providing a 
flexible framework for interaction between 
the federal and state players”.33 
Certain elements are needed for 
cooperative federalism to work. Almost all 
authors agree that each government 
possesses certain autonomous powers that 
may be exercised cooperatively. In 
Malaysia, the division of the legislative 
powers between the federal and state 
governments shows clear intention of dual 
federalism although cooperation between the 
two governments is encouraged when the 
federation is created. Article 76 of the 
Federal Constitution also provides a basis 
for cooperation as the federal government 
can legislate on matters under the State List 
upon state government’s request. In 
addition, the establishment of a national 
body such as the National Land Council, the 
Local Government Council and the 
Conference of Rulers shows that state’s 
consent remains highly relevant in the 
national development process.
34
   
Despite the dualist approach in 
legislative power, cooperation can be 
achieved as the federal principle itself is 
referred to as “the method of dividing 
powers so that the general and regional 
governments are each, within a sphere, 
coordinate and independent”.35 Cooperative 
federalism emerges where both government 
are required to work together to achieve a 
common end. On this Watts explains that the 
fundamental character of a federal system is 
a political system characterised by two sub-
systems that are neither politically 
subordinate to each other, but which interact 
in a cooperatively and competitively 
manner.
36
 In this respect it is submitted that 
jurisdiction under the Concurrent List under 
the Federal Constitution indicates 
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cooperative federalism as both government 
will work together to meet common ends.  
In the United States of America, the 
era of cooperative federalism started after 
President Franklin Roosevelt initiated the 
New Deal in 1937. During the Great 
Depression, the President felt that the only 
way to stabilize the economy was for the 
federal government to control certain state’s 
programmes such as social security, housing 
and agriculture so that he could create more 
jobs, people will have more money, spent 
more and regenerate the economy.
37
 At the 
earlier stages, the deal was seen as 
unconstitutional as the federal government 
acted beyond its constitutional power. 
Nevertheless, close cooperation between 
federal and sate government was 
strengthened by intergovernmental grants 
programme with fiscal sharing. From 1970, 
the American Congress has incorporated 
cooperative federalism in environmental 
legislations notably in pollution control 
which requires both federal and state 
governments to work together to protect the 
environment. In 1999, the Clinton 
administration gave more money to state 
government to strengthen the environmental 
power sharing. While States are given the 
liberty to administer the federal programme, 
they must adhere to the federal standards.
38
 
For a cooperative federal system to 
work, the federal government needs to 
induce States to cooperate and implement 
the federal policies at the state level. Sarnoff 
suggests that one way to induce state 
cooperation is through the “carrot and stick” 
approach.
39
 This mainly refers to 
cooperation of the state to implement federal 
policy and they will receive some funding to 
implement the policies. The fund made 
available is the ‘carrot’ and the federal 
government will impose the ‘stick’ and take 
away the fund if state fails to adhere to the 
federal standards. Fishman argues that the 
federal ‘carrot’ will provide a foundation for 
partnership in cost-sharing for state 
administration of the federal environmental 
policy.
40 The ‘stick’ to the funding refers to 
continuous federal scrutiny of state 
programme, enforcement records, issuance 
of permit and administrative orders. 
Although federal funding seems to be the 
key for cooperation, the federal government 
will achieve a certain level of uniformity 
and compliance when state government 
comply with the federal government’s 
requirement.
41
 
Cooperative federalism has also been 
practiced in Australian water resources 
management, notably in managing the 
Murray-Darling river basin which run across 
the States of New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia as well as 
the Australian Capital Territory. In 1992, the 
Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) was established as a platform for 
cooperative federalism in Australia.
42
 It is an 
inter-governmental forum in Australia which 
members include the Prime Minister, State 
Premiers and the President of the Australian 
Local Government Association.
43
 It is set up 
to “initiate, develop and monitor the 
implementation of policy reforms that are of 
national significance and which require 
cooperative action by Australian 
governments”.44 In 1994 the council 
developed the Water Reform Framework to 
create more efficient water markets through 
trading in temporary water allocations or 
permanent water entitlements. This resulted 
in the implementation of the National Water 
Initiatives which requires States to develop 
implementation plan which amongst others 
will “be developed cooperatively between 
States and Territories which share water 
resources to ensure appropriate co-
development of those actions which are of a 
cross-jurisdictional nature.”45 The carrot and 
stick approach was used when conditional 
funding was made available by the 
Commonwealth to induce States to 
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implement the framework by 2010. By 
2008, the COAG has developed programmes 
to address urban water reform, enhance 
water market and improving information 
flow and capacity building in water 
resources management. 
Cooperative federalism is also 
entrenched in the Australian Constitution. 
Section 96 of the Constitution in particular 
allows the Commonwealth Parliament to 
grant financial assistance to any State on 
such terms and conditions as the Parliament 
thinks fit. To date, this provision has been 
interpreted widely to the effect that the 
Commonwealth has granted funds in areas 
even beyond its legislative competence. The 
Commonwealth has in fact used this 
provision to persuade States to implement 
federal policy using the carrot and stick 
approach. Alternatively, the Commonwealth 
can legislate on water matters by way of 
States’ referral power. Thus it can be seen 
that prior to the enactment of the Australian 
Water Act 2007, the Commonwealth’s 
dealing in water resources was done mainly 
through political deal making with state 
governments. This situation changed in 2007 
when the Commonwealth uses its power 
under Section 51 of the Constitution which 
provides for jurisdiction over trade and 
commerce, financial corporation and 
external affairs to pass the Waters Act 
2007.
46
 The Commonwealth remains 
optimist that it will continue to receive 
cooperation from States to manage the 
Murray-Darling River Basin. Doubts have 
now arisen over the legality of the 
Commonwealth’s move to use section 51 to 
legislate on state’s matter. However, 
cooperative federalism remains a workable 
approach that enables governments at 
different level to play some role in water 
resources management in Australia.  
 
 
OTHER FORMS OF FEDERALISM AND 
FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
A federal system is theoretically an 
agreement among States to be governed by 
another federal government and the system 
can only work with cooperation between 
those in the agreement. Problems arise when 
the federal government assume too much of 
the legislative power and dual federalism 
ensues through strict application of the 
legislative capacity. This becomes more 
complicated in the management of natural 
resources as it knows no administrative 
borders and closely connected to one 
another in the ecosystem. To some degree, 
cooperative federalism is useful in managing 
natural resources as it enables a more 
holistic ecological approach towards 
environmental ills and gave more 
consideration to the entire ecosystem that 
depend on a clean environment.
47
 However, 
the dividing line between what is dual or 
cooperative federalism can sometimes be 
blurred by the fact that a federal system 
must involve cooperation between different 
levels of government in the system.  
One notable form of federal-state 
relationship is known as centralised 
federalism. Elazar (1985) once noted that a 
federation is ‘a polity compounded of strong 
constituent entities with a strong federal 
government, each possessing powers 
delegated to it by the people and empowered 
to deal directly with the citizenry in the 
exercise of those powers’.48 This means that 
a strong federal is inevitable and the absent 
of such power may lead to secession or even 
a collapse of a federation. To another 
extreme, critics have argued that the central 
government often imposes coercion to 
ensure the survival of the federation. Taylor 
for instance argues that the birth and death 
of a federation concerns with the "politics of 
sovereignty" and coercion can be used as a 
mean of force to achieve compliance, 
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especially in a hybrid federal regime like the 
Russian federation. More often than not a 
centralized federalism has been intentional. 
Finland for instance moves towards a 
centralist direction since its inception in 
1920.
49
 This occurs when the federal 
government took advantage of the weak 
position of the Austrian provinces (Lander) 
to the extent that “the Lander has been 
relegated to the position of administrative 
subunits in a decentralized state rather than 
retaining their position as the constituent 
members of a federal union”.50 Malaysia can 
be regarded as centralist since it was 
recorded in the Reid Commission that 
centralization is important to ensure the 
continuity of the federation. 
Due to different arrangement of 
federalism, some authors argue that several 
federated States do not really exercise the 
real spirit of federalism.  Riker questioned 
the very existence of federalism by stating 
that "federalism is no more than a 
constitutional legal fiction which can be 
given whatever content seems appropriate at 
the moment” as he felt that it does not make 
any difference in the way people are 
governed.
51
 On a similar note, Erk (2006) 
argues that federalism will become relevant 
if it is developed under the spirit of 
democracy as it will ensure democratic 
participation, representation and 
accountability as well as to accommodate 
territorially based ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic differences in divided societies. It 
will also be relevant for theoretical discourse 
when it focuses on the implications of 
federalism for public policy and 
governmental effectiveness.
52
 He however 
believes that federal system like Austria has 
moved in a centralist direction when the 
federal government took advantage of its 
initial power and expanded into policy areas 
under the province’s jurisdiction. The 
provinces are merely seen as ‘administrative 
subunits’ in a decentralized state and not 
being treated as constituent members of a 
federal union.
53 
Although the constitution 
provides Austria as a federation, it works as 
a unitary state in practice. It can be argued 
that Malaysia’s position is not the same as 
Austria as the state governments still possess 
a considerable list of legislative powers.  
Federal-state relation can also be 
tested in natural resources management 
which runs across administrative borders. 
Some critics refer problems in managing 
water resources as a “wicked problem” since 
the solution to these problems is 
temporary,
54
  do not react in a scientifically 
predictable manner,
55
 and require 
government to adopt an adaptive approach 
to the problem.”56 Adaptive federalism has 
then been introduced as an approach to deal 
with wicked problems within a federal 
system; though it is similar to cooperative 
federalism which requires an 
implementation plan which is more resilient 
and adaptive to changes, namely climate 
change. Since water respect no boundaries, 
decision making can then be made by the 
lowest possible administrative level affected 
with the change and can be more responsive 
and adaptive. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A fresher look into federalism acknowledges 
the fact that it stands better position to adapt 
to changes than that of a non-federal system. 
A federation involves multi-layered 
governance whereby certain capacity is 
reserved to a higher level to design policy 
and allow collective action. Although the 
lowest level of governance is more of the 
policy implementer, the designer must equip 
the local government with capacity to 
engage the stakeholders in the 
implementation. Without it, as Brown puts 
it, “there is little to prevent the inevitable 
conflicts over outcomes and performance 
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from re-infecting federal-state relations, and 
jeopardizing further collaboration”.57 
Although dual federalism encapsulates the 
agreement on power allocation between the 
federal and state government, cooperative 
federalism proves to be a better alternatives 
in the modern and complex multi-level 
governance. As a matter of facts, all parties 
are expected to be more responsive and 
adaptive to changes and challenges of the 
modern world.  
 
NOTES 
 
1  
Shad Saleem Faruqi, Document of Destiny: The 
Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, Star 
Publications (Malaysia) Bhd, Selangor, 2008, p 3. 
2 
As quoted in Elazar, D. J., Constitution-Making: 
The Pre-Eminently Political Act. Redesigning the 
State: The Politics of Constitutional Change in 
Industrial Nation. Banting &Simeon, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1985, p 232. 
3  
Elazar Constitution-Making: The Pre-Eminently 
Political Act, p 233. 
4  
Mohammad Agus Yusoff, 'The Politics of 
Malaysian Federalism: The Case of Kelantan', 
(2001) 28 Jebat, p 36. 
5
  Birch, A. H., Federalism, Finance and Social 
Legislation in Canada, Australia and the United 
States, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957, p 306.  
6
  Lijphart, A., 'Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A 
Comparison of Federal and Consociation 
Theories ', (1985) 15 (2) Publius, p 4-5.  
7
  Elazar, Exploring Federalism, p 38. 
8  
Freeley, M. M.&Rubin, E., Federalism: Political 
Identity and Tragic Compromise, The University 
of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2008, p 3. 
9  
Elazar, Exploring Federalism, p 40.  
10  
Elazar, Exploring Federalism, p 45. 
11 
As quoted in Akindele, S. T. & Olaopa, O. R., 
'The Theory and Practice of Federalism as a 
Structural Mechanism of Governance: How 
Adequate for Gender Struggle and Representation 
in Nigeria?', (2003) 5 (3) Anthropologist, p 170. 
12  
As quoted in Ebegbulem, J. C., 'Federalism and 
the Politics of Resource Control in Nigeria: A 
Critical Analysis of the Niger Delta Crisis ', 
(2011) 1 (12) International Journal of Humanities 
and Social Science, p 28. 
13  
Wheare 1953, as quoted in Ebegbulem, J. C., 
'Federalism and the Politics of Resource Control 
in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of the Niger Delta 
Crisis', (2011) 1 (12) International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science, p 220.  
14  
Elazar, Exploring Federalism, p 6. 
15  
Elazar, Exploring Federalism, p 7. 
16  
Inman, R. P. & Rubinfeld, D. L., 'Rethinking 
Federalism', (1997) 11 (4) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, p 44. 
17  
Inman & Rubinfeld, 'Rethinking Federalism', p 
45. 
18 
199, U.S. 437, 448 (1905). 
19  
As quoted in Schapiro, R. A., 'From Dualist 
Federalism to Interactive Federalism', (2007) 56 
(1) Emory Law Journal, p 4. 
20  
Harding, A., The Constitution of Malaysia: A 
Contextual Analysis, Constitutional System of the 
World, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012, p 21. 
21  
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 1871. 
22  
Kincaid, J., 'The Devolution Tortoise and the 
Centralization Hare', (1998) New England 
Economic Review, p 15. 
23  
Vijay Kelkar, Recent Evolution of Indian 
Federalism, (2010) International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) Ottawa. 
24  
Engel, K. H., 'Harnessing the Benefits of 
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law', 
(2007) 56 Emory Law Journal, p 161. 
25  
Schapiro, R. A., 'Justice Stevens's Theory of 
Interactive Federalism', (2006) 74 Fordham Law 
Review, p.2133. He explained that dual federalism 
does not describe the actual operation of 
government in the United States today especially 
in the light of September 11 and Hurricane 
Katrina.  
26  
Schapiro, 'Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive 
Federalism', p 2134. 
27  
Schapiro, 'Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive 
Federalism', p 2138. 
28  
Young, E. A., 'Dual Federalism, Concurrent 
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception', 
(2001) 69 George Washington Law Review, p 
139-188.    
29
  [1988] 1 MLJ 119. 
30
  [1996] 2 MLJ 388. 
31  
Oates, W. E., 'The New Federalism: An 
Economist's View', (1982) 2 Cato Journal, p 475.  
32  
Schapiro, R. A., 'From Dualist Federalism to 
Interactive Federalism', (2007) 56 (1) Emory Law 
Journal, p 3. 
33  
Engel, 'Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic 
Federalism in Environmental Law', p 162. 
34  
Shaik Mohd. Noor Alam S. M. Hussain, 
Federalisme di Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan 
Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1988, p 54. 
35 
Wheare, K. C., Federal Government, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1963, p 14. 
(2018) JUUM (ISU KHAS/SPECIAL ISSUE) 115 – 127 
https://doi.org/10.17576/juum-2018-special-08 
125 
 
36 
Watts, R., Administration in Federal System, 
London: Hutchinson Educational Ltd., 1970,  p 
45. 
37  
Wallis, J. J. & Oates, W. E. The Impact of the 
New Deal on American Federalism, p 155-180. 
38  
Glicksman, R. L., 'From Cooperative to 
Inoperative Federalism: The  Perverse Mutation 
of Environmental  Law and Policy', (2006) 41 
Wake Forest Law Review, p 731. 
39  
Sarnoff, J. D., 'The Continuing Imperative (but 
Only from a National Perspective) for Federal 
Environmental Protection ', (1997) 7 (2) Duke 
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, p 242. 
40  
Fischman, R. L., 'Cooperative  Federalism  and 
Natural Resources  Law', (2006) 14 N.Y. U. 
Environmental  Law Journal, p 142. 
41  
Weiser, P. J., 'Towards a Constitutional 
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism', (2001) 
79 North Carolina Law Review, p 665. 
42 
Pigram, J. J.&Musgrave, W. F. 1998. Murray-
Darling Basin: Cooperative Federalism under 
Test in Australia. Conflict and Cooperation on 
Trans-Boundry Water Resources. Just, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.p.55; see also Painter, M., 
'The Council of Australian Governments and 
Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of 
Cooperative Federalism', (1996) 2 Publius, p 101-
120. 
43  
Council of Australian Governments, About 
Council of Australian Governments, 
2013,http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag (11 
May 2013).   
44  
Australian Government Department of 
Environment, Council of Australian Governments 
Water Reform, 2013, 
http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/water/aust
ralian-government-water-leadership/council-
australian-governments-water-reform  (15 May 
2013). 
45  
Clause 9 (iii) Intergovernmental Agreement On A 
National Water Initiative Between the 
Commonwealth of Australia and the 
Governments of New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, the Australian 
Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. 
46  
S.51 (i) (xx) and (xxix) Commonwealth 
Constitution. 
47  
Fischman, 'Cooperative  Federalism  and Natural 
Resources  Law', p 187. 
48  
Elazar, Exploring Federalism, p 7. 
49  
Erk, J., 'A Federation without Federalism', (2004) 
34 (1) Publius, p 1.  
50  
Erk, 'A Federation without Federalism', p 3. 
51  
Riker 1969, as quoted in Erk, J., 'Does Federalism 
Really Matter?', (2006) 39 (1) Comparative 
Politics, p.104. The author also quote S. Rufus 
Davis’s forty-four adjectives preceding the term 
federalism which are “dual, orthodox, classic, 
polis, traditional, cooperative, bargaining, 
integrated, interdependence, reactive, new, 
permissive, functional, pragmatic, organic, 
pluralistic, monarchic, perfect, imperfect, direct, 
private, 'picket-fence, coercive, competitive, 
centralized, decentralist, peripheralized, fused, 
corporate, national, social, oligarchic, unitary, 
constitutional, international, military, political, 
monistic, polar, total, partial, contract, feudal-
functional, incipient (Rufus S. Davis, The Federal 
Principle: A Journey through Time in Quest of a 
Meaning (Berkeley:University of California 
Press, 1978), p 24. 
52 
 Erk, 'Does Federalism Really Matter?', p 104. 
53 
Erk, 'A Federation without Federalism', p.2. He 
however argued that the provinces has not only 
fail to utilize their legislative powers but also on 
all matters not specified under the Federal List or 
commonly referred to residual powers. If these 
are exercised, then the provinces should be able to 
safeguard their prerogatives. 
54  
Hearnshaw, E. J. S., Tompkins, J.-M. & Cullen, 
R. 2011. Addressing the Wicked Problem of 
Water Resource Management: An Ecosystem 
Services Approach. 55th Annual AARES 
National Conference. Melbourne, Victoria. 
55 
Allen, Gerald M. & Gould, Ernest M., 
Complexity, Wickedness, and Public Forests 
(1986) Journal of Forestry (84)4, p 20-24. 
56  
Davidson, B.& Malano, H.,'Wicked Problems 
Demand Adaptive Responses: How Does the 
Murray Darling Plan Stack Up?   ' [2011] The 
Conversation http://theconversation.com/wicked-
problems-demand-adaptive-responses-how-does-
the-murray-darling-plan-stack-up-4584 (11 
January 2014). 
57  
Brown, A. J. 2006. Federalism, Regionalism and 
the Reshaping of Australian Governance. 
Federalism and Regionalism in Australia: New 
Approaches, New Institutions? Alexandra J. 
Brown &Bellamy. New South Wales, ANU E 
Press, p 27. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Allen, G. M. & Gould, E. M. 1986. 
Complexity, wickedness, and 
public forests. Journal of Forestry 
84(4): 20-24. 
Akindele, S. T. & Olaopa, O. R. 2003. The 
theory and practice of federalism as 
(2018) JUUM (ISU KHAS/SPECIAL ISSUE) 115 – 127 
https://doi.org/10.17576/juum-2018-special-08 
126 
 
a structural mechanism of 
governance: How adequate for 
gender struggle and representation 
in Nigeria? Anthropologist 5(3): 
169-178. 
Australian Government Department of 
Environment. 2013. Council of 
Australian Governments Water 
Reform. 
http://www.environment.gov.au/top
ics/water/australian-government-
water-leadership/council-australian-
governments-water-reform [15 May 
2013].   
Birch, A. H. 1957. Federalism, Finance and 
Social Legislation in Canada, 
Australia and the United States. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Brown, A. J. 2006. Federalism, regionalism 
and the reshaping of australian 
governance. In Federalism and 
Regionalism in Australia: New 
Approaches, New Institutions?, 
edited by Alexandra J. Brown & 
Bellamy, J. A. New South Wales: 
ANU E Press. 
Council of Australian Governments. 2013. 
About Council of Australian 
Governments. 
http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag [11 
May 2013]   
Davidson, B. & Malano, H. 2011. Wicked 
problems demand adaptive 
responses: how does the Murray 
Darling plan stack up? The 
Conversation.  
http://theconversation.com/wicked-
problems-demand-adaptive-
responses-how-does-the-murray-
darling-plan-stack-up-4584 [15 
May 2012].   
Ebegbulem, J. C. 2011. Federalism and the 
politics of resource control in 
Nigeria: A critical analysis of the 
Niger Delta crisis. International 
Journal of Humanities and Social 
Science 1(12): 218-229. 
Elazar, D. J. 1985. Constitution-making: 
The pre-eminently political act.  
Dlm. Redesigning The State: The 
Politics Of Constitutional Change 
In Industrial Nation, edited by 
Banting, K. G. & Simeon, R. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Elazar, D. J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. 
Alabama: The University of 
Alabama Press. 
Engel, K. H. 2007. Harnessing the benefits 
of dynamic federalism in 
environmental law.  Emory Law 
Journal 56: 159-190. 
Erk, J. 2004. A federation without 
federalism.  Publius 34(1): 1-20. 
Erk, J. 2006. Does federalism really matter? 
Comparative Politics 39(1): 103-
120. 
Freeley, M. M. & Rubin, E. 2008. 
Federalism: Political Identity and 
Tragic Compromise. Michigan: The 
University of Michigan Press. 
Fischman, R. L. 2006. Cooperative 
federalism and natural resources 
law. New York University 
Environmental Law Journal 14: 
179-231. 
Glicksman, R. L. 2006. From cooperative to 
inoperative federalism: Perverse 
mutation of environmental law and 
policy.  Wake Forest Law Review 
41: 719-803. 
Harding, A. 2012. The Constitution of 
Malaysia: A Contextual Analysis. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Hearnshaw, E. J. S., Tompkins, J.-M. & 
Cullen, R. 2011. Addressing the 
Wicked Problem of Water 
Resource Management: An 
Ecosystem Services Approach. 55th 
Annual AARES National 
Conference. Melbourne, Victoria. 
(2018) JUUM (ISU KHAS/SPECIAL ISSUE) 115 – 127 
https://doi.org/10.17576/juum-2018-special-08 
127 
 
Inman, R. P. & Rubinfeld, D. L. 1997. 
Rethinking federalism.  Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 11(4): 43-
64. 
Kelkar, V. 2010. Recent Evolution of Indian 
Federalism. Ottawa: International 
Development Research Centre 
(IDRC). 
Kincaid, J. 1998. The devolution tortoise 
and the centralization hare. New 
England Economic Review 913-
948. 
Lijphart, A. 1985. Non-majoritarian 
democracy: A comparison of 
federal and consociation theories. 
Publius 15(2): 3-15. 
Mohammad Agus Yusoff. 2001. The politics 
of Malaysian federalism: The case 
of Kelantan. Jebat 28: 1-24. 
Oates, W. E. 1982.The new federalism: An 
economist’s view. Cato Journal 2: 
473-488. 
Pigram, J. J. & Musgrave, W. F. 1998. 
Murray-Darling Basin: Cooperative 
Federalism under Test in Australia. 
In.  Conflict and Cooperation on 
Trans-Boundry Water Resources, 
edited by Just, R. E. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Sarnoff, J. D. 1997. The continuing 
imperative (but only from a 
national perspective) for federal 
environmental protection duke. 
Environmental Law & Policy 
Forum 7(2): 225-319. 
Schapiro, R. A. 2007. From dualist 
federalism to interactive federalism. 
Emory Law Journal 56(1): 1-18. 
Schapiro, R. A. 2006. Justice Stevens’s 
theory of interactive federalism.  
Fordham Law Review 74: 2133-
2176. 
Shaik Mohd. Noor Alam S. M. Hussain. 
1988. Federalisme di Malaysia. 
Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka. 
Wallis, J. J. & Oates, W. E. the impact of the 
new deal on American federalism. 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c689
2 [13 June 2013].   
Watts, R. 1970. Administration in Federal 
System. London: Hutchinson 
Educational Ltd. 
Wheare, K. C. 1963. Federal Government. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Weiser, P. J. 2001. Towards a constitutional 
architecture for cooperative 
federalism. North Carolina Law 
Review 79: 663-720. 
Young, E. A. 2001. Dual federalism, 
concurrent jurisdiction, and the 
foreign affairs exception. George 
Washington Law Review 69: 139-
188. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rasyikah Md Khalid  
Faculty of Law 
The National University of Malaysia (UKM) 
43600 UKM Bangi 
Selangor. 
Email: rasyikah@ukm.edu.my 
 
Faridah Jalil 
Faculty of Law 
The National University of Malaysia (UKM) 
43600 UKM Bangi 
Selangor. 
Email: faridah@ukm.edu.my 
 
 
